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The Problem of Fact-Finding in
International Disputes
Thomas M. Franek and Laurence D. Cherkis*
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF THE
CREDIBILITY GAP
A NY LAWER who has litigated motor vehicle accident cases
knows that there is no such thing as a fact: there are only per-
ceptions. He will understand all too well that there can never be
an objectively true fact because the subjectivity of the perceiver,
even a programed mechanical
brain or a radar machine, is al-
THE AUTHORS: THomAs M. FRAN c ways to some extent a factor in
(B.A., LLB., University of Columbia, the rocess of perception.
LLM., S.J.D., Harvard University) is a p
Professor of Law and Director of the On the other hand, such a
Center for International Studies, New lawyer will, equally, know that
York University; LAURENCE D. CHER-
KIS (A.B., Brown University, LL.B., the degree of credence to be
New York University) is an Editorial given to different witnesses' ac-
Associate at the Center for International
Studies, New York University, and a counts of factual data will vary
member of the New York Bar. because (1) not all persons are
equally perceptive, and (2) the
degree of subjective bias varies
from perceiver to perceiver. Thus the account offered by the drunk-
ard brother of the driver of one vehicle involved in an accident will
"carry less weight" than that of the young archbishop with 20/20
vision who happened to be crossing the street at the crucial moment
and saw it all happen. The testimony of the archbishop is still not
objectively true. It may, indeed, be objectively false. But since ob-
jectivity is irrelevant to the inter-se affairs of mortal men and is ap-
propriate only to such speculative theoretical fields as exegesis and
unified-field physics, what is sought in the human decision-making
process is not truth but credibility. And credibility is a conjunction
of the psychological make-up, the training, and the perspicacity of
* The authors wish to acknowledge their indebtedness to Mr. Brynmor Pollard,
Chief Parliamentary Draftsman of Guyana, for his assistance in the preparation of parts
of this article.
1 FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 15-16 (1949), where the author examines the F factor
in his formula - R (legal rule) x F (fact) = D (court's decision) - and concludes
that a fact, in reality, is what the court thinks occurred between the litigants, and "the F
is merely a guess about the actual facts." Id. at 16.
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those who observe and report, and the extent to which these quali-
ties are apparent to those whose belief is being courted.?
If this is commonplace to the legal decision-making process, it
is less so in the related field of foreign policy decision-making. It
is not putting the matter too strongly to say that the leaders, politi-
cians, and diplomats who make foreign-policy decisions in national
capitals, at the United Nations, in Geneva and elsewhere, are losing
the confidence of the people3 - even their own people - to the
extent that, throughout the world, the "credibility gap" is widen-
ing. The people increasingly suspect that decisions crucial to their
well-being and survival are being made on the basis of factual in-
formation obtained in ways and by persons more closely resembling
the drunkard brother than the archbishop.4
This development is of particular concern to the international
lawyer because the legal consequences one draws from the flow of
events in such a dispute as that in Viet-Nam turn almost exclusively
not on choice of legal theory but upon which version of the facts
the lawyer superimposes his legal theory.
The Viet-Nam dispute and the Dominican crisis afford two ex-
cellent examples of the problem of the "credibility gap" - which
is not primarily one of deliberate distortion of fact but of a profu-
sion of conflicting witness and a lack of an authoritative, credible
system of fact-finding:
DOMIICAN CONFLiCr
Fact Issue
Were Communists
in control of
the "rebel"
movement?
Government Reporting
"Communist and Castroist lead-
ers shortly thereafter got quantities
of arms and ammunition from the
armory at the '27th February'
camp .... " 5
"And what began as a popular
democratic revolution . . . very
shortly moved and was taken over
and really seized and placed into
Private Reporting
"It is a matter of argument
whether the order to arm the civil-
ians was given by the rebel mili-
tary commanders on their own
initiative or whether they were in-
fluenced by Communists and pro-
Communists."
The Communists may have played
a crucial role in reorganizing the
rebels on April 28 after initial de-
feat, but many revolutionary lead-
2 1d. at 16-21.
3 See 20 U.N. GAOR 6, 21, 22, 57, 64-65 (1965).
4 Cf. The New Republic, Jan. 7, 1967, p. 7.
5 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 881 (1965).
6 SZULC, DOMINICAN DIARY 18 (1965).
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Fact Issue
Was the
United States
Embassy
attacked?
Did United States
troops kill Colonel
Fernandez?
Was Mr. Guzmin
"tainted"?
Government Reporting
the hands of a band of Communist
conspirators. ' 7
The United States Government
issued a list of 54 Communists
and Castroites allegedly involved
in the rebellion. Three leftist
parties were also said to be active
in the revolt.9 Fidelio Despradel
Roque, one of the 54, reportedly
received training in Cuba.1 0
"At that moment [when the
government lost control of the
population] the United States Em-
bassy was under fire ...
The United States version is that
the rebels, led by Colonel Fernan-
dez, attacked the empty Presiden-
tial Palace with heavy weapons,
and that Colonel Fernandez was
killed in the attempt.4
Mr. Guzm6n, a potential coalition
candidate, was involved in irregu-
larities as a director of the Agri-
cultural Bank of the Dominican
Republic.1 6
Private Reporting
ers were not Communists. 8
Several Communists on the State
Department list were out of the
country during the revolt. The
Soviet and Chinese Communist
Parties had very small followings.
The 14th of June movement more-
over, had once been right of cen-
ter as a result of inter-party splits.
Finally, Fidelio Despradel Roque
was known to have some "special
connections" with the United
States. His wife worked for a
pro-Western embassy.'1
"But embassy officials said later
that at no time had the embassy
building been fired upon by ma-
chine guns . . . there were never
any bullet marks on the embassy's
walls."'8
"IThe only certain thing is that
Colonel Fernandez died at that mo-
ment, shot in the back by U.S.
Marines. The rebels' version is
that the Marines had fired at his
group from across the street with-
out provocation.' 5
"[All the allegations concerning
the audit were completely false."' 7
7 52 DE'T STATE BULL. 745 (1965).
S SZULC, op. cit. supra note 6, at 51.
9 N.Y. Times, May 6, 1965, p. 1, col. 6, p. 15, coL 1.
10 52 DHP'T STATE BULL. 882 (1965).
1 SzuLc, op. cit. supra note 6, at 69-70.
12 52 DBP'T STATE BULL. 871 (1965).
13 SzuLC, op. cit. supra note 6, at 45.
14 N.Y. Times, May 20, 1965, p. 1, col. 8.
'5 SZULC, op. cit. supra note 6, at 248.
16 N.Y. Times, May 26, 1965, p. 1, col. 1, p. 17, col. 1.
17 SZULC, op. cit. supra note 6, at 276.
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VIET-NAM CoNFLict
Fact Issue
Was the Viet
Cong movement
primarily
manned and
supplied by
external
powers?
Are United States
bombings of the
North restricted
to military
targets?
Government Reporting
"Large and increasing quantities
of military supplies are entering
South Viet-Nam from outside the
country. The principal supply
point is North Viet-Nam, which
provides a convenient channel for
material that originates in Com-
munist China and other Commu-
nist countries.'1 8
Viet Cong units are reequipped
"with a type of weapons that re-
quire ammunition and parts from
outside South Viet-Nam .... .20
"It is thus apparent that infiltra-
tors from the North - allowing
for casualties - make up the ma-
jority of the so-called hard-core
Viet Cong. Personnel from the
North, in short, are now and have
always been the backbone of the
entire VC operation.122
'The only targets scheduled for
attack in the Hanoi area during the
past 24 hours were military tar-
gets....'2
"[T]here had been no bombing of
the city of Hanoi itself, because
there had been no deliberate at-
tacks on civilian areas ....- 26
Private Reporting
"No guerrilla war can succeed
without the support of the people,
for guerrillas must be fed, clothed,
recruited, etc.""'
"[I]t should be pointed out that
the overwhelming majority of the
weapons used by the Vietcong are
American-made .... ,,21
The Viet Cong can reconstitute it-
self in the South without drawing
upon men from the North.23
Tass reported that the United
States had bombed civilian areas
in Hanoi. 25
"This correspondent [Salisbury]
is no ballistics specialist, but in-
spection of several damaged sites
and talks with witnesses make it
dear that Hanoi residents certain-
ly believe that they were bombed
by United States planes, that they
certainly observed United States
planes overhead and that damage
18 U.S. DEP'T Ov STATE, AGcRESSIoN FROM THE NORTH 14-15 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH].
19 Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1965, p. 24, col. 6 (American physi-
cian in South Viet-Nam).
20 AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH 15.
21 Letter to the Editor, supra note 19.
22 AGGREsSION FROM THE NORTH 3.
2 3 N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1965, § 4, p. 1, col. 5.
2 4 N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1966, p. 2, col. 5 (quoting Pentagon officials).
2 5 N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1966, p. I, col. 6.
2 6 N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1966, p. 1, col. 8 (State Dep't).
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Fact Issue
Is the
United States
using "Lazy
Dog" bombs?
Does Hanoi
control the
Viet Cong?
Government Reporting
A United States Navy flier said
that the factory in Namdinh "was
not a target."2 8
Namdinh is a military target be-
cause it has shipping facilities and
a large anti-aircraft position.2 9
"The Department of Defense de-
nied . . . that United States forces
had used 'Lazy Dogs' in bombing
North Viemam. 31
"[The key leadership of the Viet
Cong ... operate[s] under Hanoi's
direction. ' 3
Private Reporting
certainly occurred right in the cen
ter of town. 27
The town of Namdinh produce
textiles and has no military value
It has been bombed into rubble b3
repeated attacks, and its factor
bombed 19 times.30
The United States "used 7Lazy Dog
bombs, which scattered steel pel
lets, against the civilian [Nortd
Vietnamese] population. 3 2
"Most Americans have assumed
that the Liberation Front is o
puppet of the North .... Thi
was not the impression given by
representatives of the Liberation
Front or of the North."3 4
Given that in a democratic community - national and inter-
national - witness is the right of everyone in the private sector
while decision-making is the preserve of the public sector, is there
any answer to the credibility chasm which yawns between the parts
of this dichotomy? The answer devised - haltingly and imper-
fectly - by some international and national decision-makers is to
constitute a fact-finding system utilizing persons whose psychologi-
cal makeup, independence, training, and reputation for perspicacity
is such that their fact determinations (while not necessarily true in
the objective - and irrelevant - sense) will carry a respectable
warrant of credibility. 5
27 N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1966, p. 2, col 6.
2 8 N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1966, p. 2, col. 4.
2 9 N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1966, p. 2, col 2.
30 N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1966, p. 3, col. 1 (Salisbury dispatch).
3 1 N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1967, p. 5, col. 2.
3 2 N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1967, p. 5, col. 1 (American woman visitor to Hanoi).
33 AGGREssIoN FROM THE NORTH 1.
3 4 N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1967, p. 10, cols. 3-4 (Salisbury dispatch).
35 There are at least three other functions that a fact-finding process can serve in
addition to the one to be discussed herein: (1) to stimulate public discussion of an issue;
(2) to open the procedures used in decision-making to public scrutiny and criticism;
and (3) to provide a cooling-off period during which a dispute may be resolved by
negotiation. The discussion here is confined to the use of the fact-finding process in
closing the "credibility gap."
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I. IMPARTIAL FACT-FINDING IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY BEFORE 1917
Prior to the twentieth century, commissions to investigate and
report were used sparingly, but early arbitration proceedings occa-
sionally entailed extensive investigation by persons of acknowledged
impartiality into facts underlying a dispute between sovereign en-
tities.
Judges in ancient Greece, sitting as arbitrators or conciliators in
frontier disputes, often visited a disputed area. During boundary
litigation between certain towns of Delos, the Thessalian city of
Larissa, chosen as neutral arbitrator and conciliator, sent three judges
and a secretary to the frontier.86 In other border disputes, judges
took testimony from old men who had been familiar with the dis-
puted area in their youth." Archaeological evidence, such as the
location and attitude of tombs, was admitted in order to identify
previous borders."8 In a boundary dispute between Itane and Hier-
aphytna, public documents, including old letters, maps, and treaties
were submitted to the tribunal to aid in the location of the border."
Although the Greeks failed to develop a fact-finding system
apart from their arbitration and conciliation procedures, they under-
stood the importance of credible fact-determination in resolving
"international" disputes between municipalities.
The Romans for the most part "never dreamed of an impartial
arbitration of their differences with neighboring nations, for almost
from the earliest time they struggled for domination."4  Similarly,
"the Papacy, as afterward the Roman Empire, could not conceive
of the idea of arbitration as we understand it." 1  Following the
decline of central authority in the Late Middle Ages and into the
eighteenth century, arbitrators were primarily passive receptors in
the fact-gathering process.
The signing of the 1794 Jay Treaty" signalled the beginning
of a "golden age of arbitration" which in turn led to the develop-
6RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LoCARNO 162
(1929).
37ld. at 163.
88 Ibid.
391d. at 163-64.
40ld. at 168.
41ld. at 175.
42 Treaty on Amity, Commerce, and Navigation with Great Britain, Nov. 19, 1794,
8 Stat. 116 (1794), T.S. No. 105.
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ment of separate fact-finding procedures4 This British-American
Treaty, signed to facilitate the determination of the northern bound-
ary of the United States, provided for a three-member arbitral com-
mission which inspected the disputed sites and questioned witnesses
to learn the intentions of the original negotiators 4
The movement for better settlement mechanisms was acceler-
ated by the resolution of the 1856 Congress of Paris providing that
states between which misunderstandings arise, before appealing to
arms, should have recourse, so far as circumstances might allow, to
the good offices of a friendly power! 5 Moreover, the success of the
"Alabama Claims" arbitration of 1872 further contributed to the
movement by encouraging nations other than the United States and
Britain to enter into arbitration agreements.4" Consequently, when
the Tsar convened the First Hague Conference of 1899, the ground
had been prepared for a more comprehensive peace-keeping treaty.
The Conference set up the Permanent Court of International Arbi-
tration, often described as being neither permanent nor a court4
It also instituted, inter alia, a process which was essentially not one
of arbitration but of fact-finding.
The Prussian delegation to the Conference, speaking through
Professor de Martens, proposed that disputing signatories should be
bound to establish a commission "for the purpose of ascertaining
and declaring the circumstances which give rise to a dissension, and
clearing up all the questions of fact by an impartial and thorough
examination on the spot."4 Professor de Martens argued that such
a commission would permit disclosure of the truth surrounding a
dispute "arising suddenly and from obscure or unknown causes,"
and would afford time "for the subsidence of passions and for the
transition of the acute stage of the dispute."49  The United States
and Austria, however, blocked the Prussian attempt to make sub-
mission of fact-disputes compulsory, and the final treaty provided
only that
[Iln differences of an international nature involving neither honor
nor vital interests, and arising from a difference of opinion on
439 WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION, WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION PAMPHLETS,
457-73 (1926) [hereinafter cited as WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION).
44 1 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 5, 16-22 (1898).
45 9 WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION 461.
46 Id. at 463. The arbitration treaty is reproduced in 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra note
44, at 547-53.
47 BowETr, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 215 (1963).
4 8 HULL, THE TWO HAGUE CONFERENCES 277 (1908).
49 Ibid.
19671 1489
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
points of fact, the signatory powers recommend that the parties
who have not been able to come to an agreement by means of
diplomacy should, as far as circumstances allow, institute an in-
ternational commission of inquiry, to facilitate a solution of these
differences by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and
conscientious investigation.50
In the absence of contrary agreement, each party would follow
the Convention's arbitral provisions by selecting two commissioners
from the membership of the Permanent Court or from any other
source. If these commissioners failed to agree upon an umpire,
they were to select a third power which would make the appoint-
ment. Failing agreement over the third power, each side would
select a power and both powers would choose an umpire.5 After
setting up a commission, the parties were to specify the facts at is-
sue, the powers of the commission, and the method of procedure.
Alternatively, the parties could permit the commission to formulate
its own rules." The proceedings were to be of an adversary nature,
with each side permitted to speak before the commission. 3
The Russians wanted to require each party to furnish the com-
mission with "all the means and all the facilities necessary for a pro-
found and conscientious study of the facts in the case."' The Ru-
manians, however, felt this to be a threat to national security,5 and
the drafters ultimately asked only that "the Powers engaged in dis-
pute supply the international commission of enquiry, as fully as they
may think possible, with all means and facilities necessary to en-
able it to be completely acquainted with and to accurately under-
stand the facts in question."56  After completing its work the com-
mission was to present each party with a copy of its report, which
was to be limited to a determination of facts only. Each party was
left free to act - or not to act - on such a report.57
The only commission convened under the 1899 Hague provi-
50 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899,
art. 9, 32 Stat. 1779, 1787 (1899), T.S. No. 392 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention
of 1899). See also CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE HAGUE
CONVEmTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, at 45 (Scott ed. 1915).
51 Hague Convention of 1899, art. 32, 32 Stat. 1793.
52 Id. art. 10, 32 Stat. at 1787.
53 Ibid.
54 HULL, op. cit. supra note 48, at 286-87.
55 See CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, REPORTS TO THE
HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 & 1907, at 53-54 (Scott ed. 1917); CARNEGIE ENDOW-
ME3NT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFER-
ENCEs 626-35 (Scott ed. 1907) (Conference of 1899).
56 Hague Convention of 1899, art. 12, 32 Stat. 1787.
57 Id. arts. 13-14, 32 Stat. at 1788.
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sions resulted from the "Hull" or Dogger Bank Incident. 8 On
October 9, 1904, a Russian fleet, believing itself under attack, fired
on English fishing vessels, killing two men, wounding six others,
sinking one boat, and damaging five more. A five-member com-
mission composed of high-ranking British, Russian, French, Ameri-
can, and Austrian naval officers, assisted by British and Russian
consultants and assessors, met in Paris in open sessions to hear argu-
ments of fact and the sworn testimony of summoned witnesses. The
disputants' agents were permitted to examine and cross-examine the
witnesses and to present final arguments. The commission also
accepted written statements and depositions responding to its ques-
tions. In the end, the facts found by the commission pointed to
Russia having been at fault, and compensation was paid.59
A second Hague Conference was held in 1907. It again re-
jected Russian and Dutch attempts to move toward compulsory fact-
finding. It also defeated a Russian proposal to expand the powers
of commissions to permit them to affix fault instead of merely im-
plying it through findings of fact."0  The Conference retained the
five-member commission but supplemented the 1899 provisions by
requiring that a deadlock in the selection of an umpire be resolved
by drawing the name of a Permanent Court panelist from a list of
nominees submitted by the disputants. 1
The Convention also added twenty-two procedural articles to
the 1899 Convention, primarily because the British. and French felt
that the Dogger Bank Commission had lost valuable time drafting
ad hoc procedures."
Under Article 15, a permanent registry for commissions was
established at The Hague. 3 In addition to retaining the prior dis-
covery rule,64 the Convention obligated each disputant "to insure
the appearance of the witnesses or experts who are in their territory
and have been summoned before the commission."65  Effect could
58 RALSTON, Tm LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 433-34
(1926).
59 Id. at 43; RALSTON, op. cit. spra note 36, at 294.
60 HULL, op. cit. supra note 48, at 289-91.
01 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907,
art 45, 36 Star. 2199, 2223, T.S. No. 536 thereinafter cited as Hague Convention of
1907J. See also CAMNGE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, op. cit. supra
note 50, at 59-60.
62 Hague Convention of 1907, arts. 51-85, 36 Stat. 2226-33. See also HULL, op.
cit. supra note 48, at 292.
63 Hague Convention of 1907, art. 15, 36 Stat. 2215-16.
64Id. art. 23, 36 Stat. at 2217.
65Ibid.
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be given the new provision by invoking national law, but it re-
mained uncertain whether the Convention required amendment of
national law to insure its efficacy. Commissions could also apply
to the government of a nondisputant signatory for permission to
obtain evidence within its boundaries pursuant to national law, and
such requests were not to be rejected "unless the power in question
considers they are calculated to impair its sovereign rights or its
safety."6 6
Two commissions were established under these rules to investi-
gate the arrest of the Tavignano and the firing upon the Camouna
and the Gaulois, all Tunisian vessels, by Italian warships. An agree-
ment signed on May 20, 1912, instructed a commission to investi-
gate the geography and hydrography of the coast and waters where
the incident occurred. The commissioners - French, Italian, and
English - received such evidence as letters, depositions, log books,
surveys, and oral testimony. The facts developed indicated Italy
was to blame, and she was told to pay France five thousand francs,
indemnification." The last commission constituted under the
Hague conventions was organized in 1921 to verify the sinking of
the Dutch ship Tubantia by German torpedo in 1916 and to deter-
mine whether the firing was intentional. The commission was
composed of naval representatives from the Netherlands, Denmark,
Sweden, and Germany, and was presided over by a Swiss. The com-
mission took pleadings, statements of fact, and expert testimony.
It decided that the Tubantia had been sunk by a torpedo fired from a
German submarine but the commission failed to determine whether
the firing had been intentional. "8
With the shortcomings of the Hague Convention apparent, Sec-
retary of State Bryan, in 1913, supplemented the scope of exist-
ing United States arbitration agreements by persuading the United
States Senate to accept a series of bilateral treaties requiring that
"all disputes ... of every nature whatsoever, which diplomacy shall
fail to adjust" be submitted to standing five-man international com-
missions for which each treaty made provision." These were to
consist of one national representative from each signatory, one non-
66Id. art. 24, 36 Stat. at 2217-18.
6 7 RALSTON, op. cit. supra note 36, at 294.
68 Id. at 294-95.
6 9 The first treaty, Treaty with Guatemala on the Advancement of Peace, Sept. 20,
1913, 38 Stat. 1840 (1913), T.S. No. 598, set the basic format that was followed in all
subsequent agreements. 9 WORLD PEACE FOUJNDATION 536-37. The text of all
treaties signed can be found in CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
TREATIES FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEACE (1920).
1492 [VOL 18: 1483
THE PROBLEM OF FACT-FINDING
national chosen by each signatory, and one member chosen by com-
mon agreement."° The contracting parties were bound to refrain
from acts of war during the investigation.7 Each commission was
authorized to "act upon its own initiative, and in such case it
[should] notify both Governments and request cooperation in the
investigation."'72 Although the United States signed treaties with
twenty-one nations embodying this prophylactic principle, the com-
missions were never called upon to investigate any disputes. By
1926 only the commissions established with Denmark, Portugal,
and Sweden were still fully staffed.7"
II. MODERN IMPARTIAL FACT-FINDING (1967)
The League of Nations Covenant contained the first provision
permitting the establishment of a third-party fact-finding commis-
sion whose members would be responsible to an international organ-
ization rather than to their governments. Under article 11 of
the Covenant, war or the threat of war was deemed "a matter of
concern to the whole League" which "shall take any action deemed
wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations."'75 Article 15
further provided that when a dispute was "likely to lead to a rup-
ture" it could be submitted to the Council or Assembly which was
empowered to enjoin and then investigate the dispute.7" A com-
mission report, if adopted by the Council or Assembly, could be re-
jected by a disputant only at the risk of sanctions being imposed
under article 16."
The first dispute to involve article 15 arose between Finland
and Sweden in 1921. After separating from Russia, Finland con-
tinued to assert control over the Aaland Islands although most of
their inhabitants were of Swedish culture. The islanders began
agitating for a return to Sweden, where their plight provoked sym-
pathetic demonstrations. In June of 1920, the Finns landed troops
on the islands, and on September 20 the League Council appointed
a Commission of Enquiry and ordered it "to furnish the Council...
70 Treaty with Guatemala on the Advancement of Peace, Sept. 20, 1913, art. 2, 38
Stat. 1840, 1841 (1913).
71 Id. art. 1, 38 Stat. at 1840-41.
72 Id. art. 3, 38 Stat. at 1841-42.
73 9 WORMn PEACE FOUNDATION 540.
7 4 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 9 [hereinafter cited as COVENANT].
7 5 COVENANT art. 11, para. 1.
76 COVENANT art. 15, para. 1.
7 7 COVENANT art. 16, paras. 1, 4.
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having regard to the legitimate interests of all parties concerned,
with a Report which will enable it to frame a final or provisional
settlement . "..."78 The Commission was composed of a former
Belgian foreign minister, a former Swiss president, and a former
United States ambassador to Turkey. 9 After six weeks of investi-
gation in Sweden, Finland, and the Aaland Islands, the Commission
recommended not only continuation of Finnish sovereignty but also
that the islands be neutralized, that Swedish be continued to be
taught in the schools, and that private property rights be respected."0
Both sides reluctantly accepted the report, and in 1922 participated
in a multilateral nonfortification treaty.81
The settlement of the Greek-Bulgarian crisis of 1925 marked
the high point for League peace-keeping operations. In October
a border incident had brought the two nations to the brink of war
when the League Council sent French, British, and Italian military
officers to the border to observe and report.' After the troops
pulled back, the Council sent five commissioners (from Britain,
Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden) who, after three weeks
in the area, recommended that the border posts be moved back from
the boundary line and that a standing conciliation commission be
established to settle future conflicts.8" This settlement was accepted
by the disputants."
Under French administration, the Mandate of Syria also held
its "self-determination" elections of 1938 in the Sanjak of Alexan-
dria under the supervision of an international commission, the mem-
bers of which were appointed by the Council of the League.
Fact-finding procedures were also appended to the conventions
establishing international adjudicatory and arbitral institutions.
The Statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice and
its successor, the International Court of Justice, provide that the
"Court may, at any time, entrust any individual, body, bureau, com-
mission, or other organization that it may select, with the task of
carrying out an inquiry or giving an expert opinion."" In the Corfu
78 9 LEAGUE OF NATIoNs COUNCIL MINUrEs, Annex 101, at 73, 77 (1920).
79 INTERNATIONAL PEACE OBSERVATION 13 (Wainhouse ed. 1966).
80 Report of the Commission of Rapporteurs on the Aaland Islands Question,
League of Nations Council Doc. B/7 21/68/106 (1921).
81 Convention relating to the Non-Fortification and Neutralization of the Aaland
Islands, Oct. 20, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 211.
82 6 LEAGUE OF NATIoNs OFF. J. 1700, 1707 (1925).
88 5 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, MONTHLY SUMMARY 327-30 (1925).
84 INTERNATIONAL PEACE OBSERVATION 52 (Wainhouse ed. 1966).
8 5P.C.I.J. STAT. art. 50; LC.J. STAT. art 50.
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Channel case,"s the findings of an expert commission composed of
Dutch, Norwegian, and Swedish naval officers, established Alba-
nian complicity in the peacetime sinking of a British warship.'
Nevertheless, in cases such as Temple of Preah Vihear Case,8 in-
volving a border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, and in
the Minquiers and fcrehos Case,89 which raised the question whether
Britain or France had exercised sovereignty over two groups of islets
in the English Channel, the International Court of Justice resolved
the factual issues without resorting to field research. In fact, nei-
ther court ever invoked its power to exercise "its functions elsewhere
whenever the Court considers it desirable."9
Other contemporary instruments for dispute-settlement contain
provisions designed to encourage and facilitate impartial fact-find-
ing. The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of
19281 required its signatories "to use the means at their disposal
to allow it [conciliation commission] to proceed in their territory,"
to summon and hear witnesses and experts under national law, and
"to visit the localities in question."92  Similarly, under the Model
Rules of Arbitral Procedure of the International Law Commission,a
an arbitral tribunal "may... if necessary, decide to visit the scene
connected with the case before it."9" And, finally, the International
Labour Organisation (ILO), which has among its purposes "the col-
lection and distribution of information on all subjects relating to
the international adjustment of conditions of industrial life and
labour,"9 is empowered to establish commissions to investigate
whether "any... Member is securing the effective observance of
any Convention which... [it has) ratified."98 The ILO's Commit-
tee on Freedom of Association, for example, investigates complaints
s6 Corfu Channel Case, [1949] LCJ. 4.
87Id. at 9.
88 [1962] LC.J. 6.
89 [1953] LC.J. 47.
90 LCJ. STAT. art. 22(1), para. 1.
91Sept. 26, 1928, 93 LN.T.S. 343.
92 Geneva Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Sept. 26, 1928,
art. 13, 93 L.N.T.S. 343, 351. The identical language also appears in Revised General
Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, art. 13 April 28, 1949, 71 U.N.
T.S. 102, 108.
98 13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/3859 (1958).
94 ibi.
95 INTEmATIONAL LABoUR ORGANISATION CONSTrrUTION art. 10, 15 U.N.T.S.
40, 56 (1948) [hereinafter cited as ILO CONST.J.
96110 CoNsr. art. 26, 15 U.N.T.S. 66 (1948).
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by labor organizations against governments and other labor groups
and reports to the Governing Body.97
A. Three Instances of Impartial Fact-Finding by United Nations
Ad Hoc Missions
Continuing and expanding the pioneer efforts of such interna-
tional organizations as the League, the Organization of American
States, and the ILO, the United Nations has undertaken a number
of significant fact-finding missions, three of which deserve consid-
eration in greater detail in order to achieve better understanding of
the problems, potential, and operating modes of such bodies.9"
(1) The United Nations Mission to Malaysia.-With North
Borneo and Sarawak about to emerge from British colonial tutelage,
territorial elections in both places returned governments favorable
to the British-Malayan scheme for a Federation of Malaysia. The
Philippines and Indonesia, with their own politico-legal claims to
the region, strongly opposed this disposition.
On August 8, 1963, the Secretary-General, acting upon the re-
quest of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia, appointed a mis-
sion of inquiry operating as two subcommissions charged with ascer-
taining "the wishes of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and
Sarawak" and whether recent territorial elections fairly and freely
97 SIXTH REPORT OF THE INTERNAiIONAL LABOuR ORGAN TION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS 169-96 (1952).98 Artide 34 of the UN Charter permits the Security Council to "investigate any
dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dis-
pute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." This article is bind-
ing on all United Nations members. Article 36 permits the Security Council to "recom-
mend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" to settle disputes. U.N. CHAR-
TER art. 36, para. 1. This article, however, merely calls for a recommendation to the
disputants to engage in peace observation or other techniques. Article 37 merely di-
rects the Security Council to invoke article 36 if a dispute "is in fact likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 37, para. 1.
Under these articles, fact-finding missions may be blocked by a permanent member's
veto. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. Under article 29, however, the Security Council
may establish "such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its
functions." This would permit the appointment of a fact-finding team and is not sub-
ject to great power veto.
U.N. CHARTER art. 11, para. 1 authorizes the General Assembly to "discuss any
questions relating to the maintenance of international peace," and article 14 permits
the Assembly to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation.
Such recommendations require a two-thirds vote, U.N. CHARTER art 18, para. 2, so
that General Assembly fact-finding missions are of major significance.
Article 99 empowers the Secretary-General to bring to the Security Council's atten-
tion matters which threaten to disrupt international peace. Under this provision, the
Secretary has appointed fact-finding missions to determine whether a dispute threatens
international peace.
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evidenced majority support for federation. 9 The three heads of
government further agreed that it was "desirable to send observers
to witness the carrying out of the task to be undertaken by the work-
ing teams."
100
Accordingly, Malaya undertook to extend to the Secretary-Gen-
eral "the necessary facilities so as to enable him to carry out his
task."'' On August 12, 1963, the Secretary-General assigned eight
impartial Secretariat personnel, headed by the Deputy Director of
Personnel, Lawrence V. Michelmore, to the United Nations Malay-
sia Mission.0"  Although the British and Malayans did make the
concession of postponing the target date for federation from August
31 to September 16, the work of the Mission nevertheless appears
to have suffered from the pressure of working against both a dead-
line and a predetermined result imposed by Kuala Lumpur.
Nevertheless, the Mission worked with methodological skill and
thoroughness. Obviously an investigation of a social-psychological
fact of general application requires for its validity the broadest pos-
sible sample-base. This requirement was substantially met. In
Sarawak and in North Borneo the radio and press announced that
written statements would be received and hearings held in different
parts of the territory and invited representation from individuals
and groups. In preparation for the hearings, the Mission studied
relevant electoral laws and procedures as well as election returns.
It also received memoranda from major political parties including
the anti-federation Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP). These
hearings were held in the population centers most accessible to out-
lying areas, and once underway, the hearings became the principal
items discussed by the news media.'
The Mission concluded that the authorities, upon whom they
were dependent for communications, transportation, and security,
did not discourage "anyone from appearing before it, that [no] wit-
ness was inhibited in his testimony . . . [and thati some of the
strongest expressions of anti-Malaysia views... were made... in
the locations in which security measures were visible .... "1 04  The
Sarawak team consulted with all 429 elected district representatives
9 UN=TED NATIoNs MALAYSIA MISSION, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
para. 1 (1963) (unpublished official document).
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Id. paras. 4-10.
104 Id. para. 10.
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and spoke with 400 persons representing sixty political, religious,
and labor groups. Sixteen of the Mission's 37 hours of hearings
were devoted to consultations with elected representatives, thirteen
to anti-federation groups, and only the remainder to pro-federation
forces.105
One procedural defect marked the proceedings, and this con-
cerned not the Mission but the partisan observers. Disagreements
with the United Kingdom over the number and status of these ob-
servers delayed their arrival until September 1. Tape recordings of
earlier hearings were made available, but the observers attended
only half the hearings.'0"
The following three examples of factual issues resolved by the
Mission demonstrate characteristic "substantive'" obstacles faced by
fact-finding groups. It will readily be seen that they are not differ-
ent in kind from the unresolved factual issues of the Dominican
and Viet-Nam disputes.0 7
(a) Had the Electoral Registers Been Properly Compiled?
-During the Sarawak hearings the SUPP alleged that in certain
districts only ten to twenty percent of all qualified voters had regis-
tered. This contrasted with the government's figure of 84.6 per-
cent registration overall.' 8 The Mission, examining the registers
and hearing evidence, concluded that although isolated failures may
have occurred, registration had been substantially successful and
honest.' In North Borneo the integrity of the registration system
went unchallenged.
(b) Had the Elections Been Held in a "Free Atmosphere"?
-The SUPP alleged that twenty-six of its leaders were arrested un-
der the guise of security measures and that the government had
intimidated local SUPP officials and attempted to discredit the party
by a vicious propaganda campaign."0  In response, the govern-
ment pleaded the need to maintain security in the face of Indonesian
and Communist-inspired violence. The Mission held itself unquali-
fied to evaluate the extent to which security measures were neces-
sary to protect Sarawak from subversion but decided that there had
been no concerted drive to debilitate the SUPP."'
105 Id. paras. 8-9.
106 GOV'T OF INDONESIA, A SURVEY OF THEI CONTROVERSIAL PROBLEM OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA 11, 14 (1963).
1 07 See text accompanying notes 5-34 supra.
108UNiTED NATIONS MALAYSIA MISSION, op. cit. supra note 99, paras. 78-79.
109Id. paras. 80-81.
110 Id. paras. 87-88.
Ill Id. para. 96.
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It was further alleged that the government had induced many
SUPP members to resign. It was stated that illiterate people had
submitted resignations written on government typewriters and sta-
tionery. The Mission concluded, after hearing both sides, that the
government's conduct had failed to provoke mass resignations. It
also found that even those who had resigned were not thereby in-
hibited from voting in secret as they pleased." 2  In North Borneo,
no such allegations were made.
(c) Had Federation Been the Principal Issue in the Local
Elections?-The Mission, after investigation in North Borneo and
Sarawak, answered this question in the affirmative. After discus-
sions with political groups, candidates, and voters, it became dear
that the election had turned almost entirely on this issue and that
it had been widely and openly debated."'
The Mission concluded that the people of Sarawak and North
Borneo had registered their assent to the federation. This approval
was deemed the "result of the freely expressed wishes of the terri-
tory's people acting with free knowledge of the change in their
status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and
democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal
adult suffrage."" 4
(2) The United Nations Missions to Oman.--Oman, with its
principal coastal town of Muscat, is an independent territory located
on the southeastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula. In 1891 the
British government and the ruling Sultan of Oman signed a treaty
which granted Britain a form of veto over Omani foreign policy."'
In 1915 British assistance was instrumental in quelling a revolt
against the Sultan originating in an interior region under the ad-
ministration of the Imam of Oman." 6 In 1920 British-inspired
negotiations between the Sultan and the Imam resulted in a treaty
guaranteeing the interior regions "the right of self-government, or
non-interference.., in their internal affairs .... 17
In 1955 the dispute revived. The Sultan, operating with Brit-
ish-led Omani troops, moved into Nazwa, the Imamate "capital."
112 Id. paras. 90-91.
11 Id. paras. 210-13.
114 Id. para. 245.
l5 Treaty of Friendly Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Mus-
cat, March 19, 1891, 83 STATE PAPERS (British) 11 (Oakes & Maycock ed. 1897).
116 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman, 19 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda
Item No. 65 (provisional), at 69, U.N. Doc. A/5846 (1965).
117Id. at 31.
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It was alleged that the Sultan's action was prompted by a British
desire for oil rights in the interior. The Imam fled to Cairo, where
he was able to organize his opposition. In 1957 the British lent
the Sultan further ground and air support to quell another revolt in
the region. 1
Naturally, such events could no longer transpire without at-
tracting the attention of the United Nations political organs. In
December of 1962, despite General Assembly rejection of a draft
resolution of the Special Political Committee calling for "the with-
drawal of foreign forces from Oman,""' 9 the Secretary-General, at
the Sultan's invitation, dispatched a representative "to visit the Sul-
tanate during the coming year to obtain first-hand information as
to the situation there."'"o The Secretary-General selected the Swed-
ish Ambassador to Spain, Mr. Herbert de Ribbing. He was accom-
panied by a political officer and an interpreter from the United
Nations Secretariat and was admonished to determine "the presence
of foreign troops in Oman, any evidence of oppression, instances of
sabotage and fighting, the existence of a 'rebel movement' [and]
the existence of any 'rebel forces' actually in control of a particular
area .... "121
Again, the Mission's procedure is informative. Mr. de Ribbing
left New York on May 18, 1963 and remained in the Middle East
until June 25. He was permitted to visit any place he desired.
The Mission met with about twenty Government officials, inter-
viewed eighty-six representative individuals and explained the pur-
pose of its visit to approximately 1,200 people assembled at
meetings .... Many meetings with individuals or groups of
prominent persons were held where no Government official was
present. 22
Although de Ribbing conceded that his investigation "could not
be fully comprehensive,' 12  he did find sufficient evidence to sup-
port a number of important fact determinations.
The final report confirmed that Britain had given substantial
military support in 1957 to bolster the Sultan's power in the Imam-
11Sld. at 75-77.
119 17 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 79, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/5325
(1962).
120 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on his Visit to
Oman, 18 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 78, at 2, U.N. Doc A/5562 (1963).
121 Id. at 11.
122 Id. at 12.
123 ibid.
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ate. 24 In addition, de Ribbing found that approximately sixty Brit-
ish officers and eight British planes were still stationed in Oman.'25
On the other hand, he reported an absence of overt political oppres-
sion, although noting that most persons questioned tended to deny
its existence in cautious tones.'2 6 Ambassador de Ribbing under-
standably declined to go beyond these limited determinations to
draw a conclusion of fact as to whether the British presence in Oman
should be regarded as aid to the recognized civil powers or as colo-
nial intervention. 2 '
The General Assembly's Fourth Committee reopened debate
upon receiving the report. Several delegations, citing a memoran-
dum from the Committee for the Rights of Oman purporting to
document the British presence and complicity in atrocities, called
for a new mission on the ground that the de Ribbing Report was
incomplete.' Consequently, on December 11, 1963, the General
Assembly established an ad hoc committee "composed of five Mem-
ber States appointed by the President of the General Assembly to
examine the question of Oman,"'29 and soon thereafter the president
requested Afghanistan, Costa Rica, Nepal, Nigeria, and Senegal to
appoint representatives to the committee.' In the absence of spe-
cific directives the committee decided to investigate the "territorial,
historical and political issues involved in the problem."' 3 '
Believing the committee to be far from impartial, the Sultan
denied it access to Oman, and this fact beclouded the Mission's op-
erational methodology. It pursued the study of various historical
and legal works concerning Oman and scheduled interviews outside
its borders, in Damman, Kuwait, and Cairo, where it saw 175 per-
sons, including members of the Revolutionary Council opposing the
Sultan, as well as private individuals, students, and tribal represen-
tatives. The committee received over 150 written communications
from Omani refugees and, in Damman, interviewed the deposed
Imam and three members of his Higher Council.'82
Given its composition and role, the committee's findings were
:124 Id. at 18.
125 d. at 14.
126 Ibid.
127 Id. at 16.
128 18 U.N. GAOR, 4th Comm. 451-56 (1963).
129 19 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 65 (provisional), at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/5846 (1965).
180 Ibid.
131,d, at 4.
182Id. at 11.
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much more concerned with the "political" facts than was the report
of Ambassador de Ribbing. Not surprisingly, considering the
sources of its evidence, the findings of the former also tended to
contradict some of those of the latter. The committee found, for
example, that British force had saved the Sultanate from the Imam's
forces in 1915 and had for a time influenced the Sultan to settle
his dispute with the Imam. 8' During this period, after the 1921
Treaty of Sib, the Sultan had regarded the Imamate as an autono-
mous region with de facto independence."8 4 The Mission thus con-
cluded that subsequent encroachments on the Imamate were unlaw-
ful.
The report further determined that Britain still retained sub-
stantial influence over Oman's military and foreign affairs in 1955,
at the time of the renewed troubles. Thus, when in 1955 and 1957
the Sultan reoccupied areas previously reserved to the Imamate,
"the United Kingdom was associated in some way in the formula-
don of policy on this matter."'85  This conclusion was buttressed
by reference to a 1937 agreement in which the Sultan promised to
facilitate the prospecting of British oil companies in hostile areas.'
Finally, the committee concluded that in central Oman "the popula-
tion was solidly behind the Imam."' 7 Thus resolving the basic
fact-issue of its investigation, the committee declared that the United
Kingdom intervened to help a government of uncertain popularity
defeat a popular movement in order to secure its own interests. 88
At its next session the General Assembly, acting on the ad hoc
committee's findings, adopted a resolution noting that "the colonial
presence of the United Kingdom in its various forms prevents the
people of the Territory [of Oman] from exercising their rights to
self-determination and independence .... Subsequently, the
Special Committee on Colonialism reconsidered the Oman question,
and both the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly recog-
nized the "legitimacy of [Oman's] struggle to achieve the rights
laid down in the Charter of the United Nations."'
4°
13' Id. at 69.
134 Id. at 74-75.
lSId. at 76.
186 Id. at 75-76.
1371d. at 77.
138 Ibid.
139 G.A. Res. 2073, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
14 0 Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Imple-
mentation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, 103-36, U.N. Doc. A/6300/Add. 8 (1966); Report of the Fourth Corn-
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(3) The United Nations Mission to Viet-Nam.-On Septem-
ber 4, 1963, fourteen members of the United Nations requested
that the General Assembly agenda include a discussion of "The Vio-
lation of Human Rights in South Viet-Nam."'' These members
alleged that the Diem regime had embarked upon a systematic cam-
paign to repress the religious and civil rights of Vietnamese Bud-
dhists, who comprised over seventy percent of the population. It
was further charged that the government had killed nine persons
attempting to celebrate Buddha's birthday and that, subsequently,
pagodas had been raided and hundreds of nuns and monks ar-
rested.' On October 4, 1963, after the General Assembly had
placed the item on the agenda, the government of South Viet-Nam
invited the representatives of the United Nations to visit the country
to determine the situation for themselves.143 On October 11, 1963,
the president of the General Assembly requested Afghanistan,
Brazil, Ceylon, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Morocco, and Nepal to ap-
point representatives to such a Mission. Chaired by Mr. Abdul
Rahman Pazwak of Afghanistan, it also had the assistance of Dr.
John P. Humphrey, Director of the Secretariat's Human Rights Di-
vision, 44 and was thus in part an expert as well as impartial body.
Although the President of the General Assembly directed the
Mission to "ascertain the facts of the situation.., as regards rela-
tions between the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and
the Viet-Namese Buddhist community," 45 the group drafted more
specific terms of reference and set out its methodology.
The Mission is an ad hoc fact-finding body and has been estab-
blished to ascertain the facts of the situation as regards the alleged
violations of human rights by the Government of the Republic of
Viet-Nam in its relations with the Buddhist community of that
country.' [It would] seek factual evidence ... collect infor-
mation, conduct on-the-spot investigations, receive petitions and
hear witnesses. 47
It did not depart from this standard. Upon its arrival, for example,
mittee, Question of Oman, G.A. Res. 2238, Agenda Item No. 70, 21 U.N. GAOR 3,
U.N. Doc. A16622 (Jan. 6, 1967) (mimeo).
141U.N. Doc. A/5439 (1963).
142 U.N. Doc. A/5489/Add. 1 (1963).
143 U.N. Doc. A/5542 (1963).
144 Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission to South Viet-Nam, 18 U.N.
GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 77, paras. 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/5630 (1963).
145 Id. § 5.
146 Id. Annex No. 2, § 12.
147 Id. § 13.
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the Mission found that the South Vietnamese government had pre-
pared a suggested itinerary. This was firmly rejected, and the group
successfully insisted on following its own program, including the
conduct of secret hearings. 4 '
To attract witnesses and publicize its purposes, the Mission pre-
pared a statement announcing its presence and calling for testimony
in person or in writing. The government agreed to publish this
statement widely and in full, after securing its amendment to indi-
cate that the Mission was in South Viet-Nam at the invitation of
the regime. 49 Its call, however, brought forth only four voluntary
witnesses in Saigon and three in Hu6. The Mission did speak to
forty-seven other monks, nuns, prisoners, students, and laymen
whose names it had received in New York and Saigon.' These
persons were interviewed without government officials being pres-
ent. Each witness was assured that all testimony would remain
confidential.' 5' The Mission also received and considered 116 writ-
ten communications from individuals and groups, twelve being un-
signed, with five pleading fear of government retaliation. "' In
addition, eight high-ranking government officials, including Ngo
Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu, were interviewed. " '
Although the government insisted on furnishing the Mission's
transportation and security arrangements, the mission succeeded in
having the United Nations flag flown on transport and other facili-
ties.' One written statement received by the group indicated that
the writer had tried to see the Mission while it was in Viet-Nam
but was kept away by security troops guarding the place of hearings.
It cannot, however, be said that the government prevented un-
favorable reports from reaching the United Nations group. The
Mission received evidence from Buddhist leaders and students to
support allegations of religious and political repressions and official
discrimination in employment. Its report also reproduces detailed
charges of government raids on pagodas and subsequent mass ar-
rests55 but notes the official explanation that such measures were
148 Id. §13-16.
149 Id. § 23-25.
150 Id. §5 37-48, 56.
151Id. S 49.
152 Id. § 151.
153 Id. § 72.
154 Id. § 13.
155 Id. §5 86-147.
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necessary to combat Communist subversion and resistance to lawful
authority. 5
0
The Mission terminated its investigation on November 3, 1963,
immediately after the coup which overthrew President Diem. Con-
sequently, the report did not evaluate the evidence or pass judgment
upon the conduct of the government, and for this reason its findings
were also not discussed in the General Assembly.5 ' Private inquiry
suggests the paradoxical possibility that an evaluation of the evi-
dence might not have produced findings as uniformly unfavorable
to the Diem regime as had been anticipated.
B. Periodic Fact-Finding by the United Nations Trusteeship
Council and the Committee of Twenty-Four
In addition to these three ad hoc missions, a number of organs
and sub-organs of the United Nations regularly engage in fact-
finding. Two of these should be mentioned briefly.
Article 87(c) of the United Nations Charter permits the Trust-
eeship Council to "provide for periodic visits to the respective trust
territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority."'58
The Council periodically delegates one member from each of two
administering states other than the administrator under investiga-
tion and one member from each of two non-administering states 5"
to "investigate and report as fully as possible on the steps taken in
the... Trust Territories towards the realization of the objective set
forth in Article 76(b) of the Charter .... .10 In addition, the
Council's petition procedure and its right to receive and review an-
nual reports from administering authorities augment its fact-finding
role.
1561d. §§ 72-85.
15 7 Y.B. OF THE UNITED NATIONS 50 (1963).
'58 U.N. CHA TER art 87(c).
159 MRRAY, THE UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM 183-85 (1957). Be-
tween 1947 and 1961 the Trusteeship Council received forty-five reports from missions
visiting Western Samoa, Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, Pacific Islands, Nauru, New
Guinea, Italian Somaliland, West Africa, the Cameroons, Ewe, and Togoland. UNITED
NATIONS, OFFICIAL REcoRDs 1948-62, at 92-101, U.N. Doc. ST/L/CS (1963).
160 See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East
Africa, 1960, Tanganyika, 26 U.N. TRusTEEsHIP, Supp. 2, para. 2, U.N. Doc. T/1550
(1960). Article 76(b) provides that:
one of the basic objectives of the trusteeship system is to promote the po-
litical, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the
trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government
or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each
territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples con-
cerned. U.N. CHARTER art. 76, para. b.
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The role of the Trusteeship Council's visiting inspection mission
in the British-administered Tanganyika Trusteeship, shortly before
that country's independence, is illustrative.
In March 1960, the Council sent representatives from the
United States, New Zealand, Paraguay, and the United Arab Re-
public to East Africa. At Dar Es Salaam, Tanganyika, the Mission
consulted with the Governor, the Speaker of the Legislative Coun-
cil, and other high officials.16' The Mission then split into two
groups to travel throughout the country in accordance with a well-
publicized schedule. During this journey the Mission met with
provincial officials and inspected farms, factories, and government
projects, giving special attention to the Tanganyika African Na-
tional Union (TANU), the predominant nationalist party, in order
to determine the quality and direction of the political leadership
which would inherit power after independence. 6 ' On April 20,
the Mission conducted final public hearings in Dar Es Salaam and
proceeded to London to confer with the Colonial Secretary. It then
returned to New York with volumes of memoranda submitted by
the government and by various interest groups.'63
The constructive final report; while welcoming Tanganyika's
rapid progress to self-government, cited the pressing need for more
African civil servants, for external aid to expand Tanganyika's nar-
rowly based industrial and agricultural sectors, and stressed the
shortage of funds available for educational facilities. "4 The Mis-
sion received few complaints regarding racial prejudice in the land
tenure system which was so controversial in nearby Kenya and the
Rhodesias. It concluded that most land disputes had become inter-
tribal rather than interracial.'65 Its general conclusion was that
"Tanganyika is proceeding smoothly and rapidly towards the ulti-
mate goal set by the International Trusteeship System and that the
problems which remain are very largely of a technical and financial
nature."' 6  The Trusteeship Council's resolution accepting the re-
port invited the British to "take into account" the Mission's conclu-
161 Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Af-
rica, 1960, Tanganyika, supra note 160, paras. 4-6.
162 Id. paras. 7, 41-48.
163 Id. Annex No. 1.
164 Id. paras. 102-09, 116, 117, 119, 234.
165Id. paras. 134-35.
166 Id. para. 279.
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sions and, notably, did not request acceleration of the British plan
for Tanganyikan independence (which came in December 1961).17
The Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Indepen-
dence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of Twenty-
Four) was established by the General Assembly pursuant to the pro-
visions of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter in order "to
make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent
of the implementation of the Declaration" and to adopt procedures
toward this end.' These have included the holding of hearings
and investigations "on the spoe' in many countries as well as in New
York. Typical of these efforts is the mission to Equatorial Guinea
in 1966, to determine whether the people of that colony desired
independence and whether Spain was in default of her "obligation"
to lead the territory to independence if the inhabitants so deter-
mined.' 69 Having obtained Spanish approval for the visit, the Com-
mittee appointed Ambassador Gershon 0. B. Collier of Sierra Leone
to chair a subcommittee which included representatives of Chile,
Denmark, Mali, Poland, Syria, and Tanzania - a group politically
balanced if not judicially impartial. On August 17 and 18, the
Mission met with officials in Madrid and received assurances that
the territory was virtually autonomous and that the "Spanish Gov-
ernment would accede to their wishes" if a majority of the people
requested independence.170
The Mission thereupon spent five days in Equatorial Guinea,
where it interviewed members of the Governing Council as well as
representatives of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberaci6n de la
Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE), who had prepared memoranda
detailing their grievances after noting the press and radio announce-
ments preceding the Mission's arrival.' In open meetings, party
representatives asserted that the Spanish authorities had discrimi-
nated against Africans, had suppressed opposing political parties,
and had maneuvered a 1963 plebescite to make it appear that a
167 U.N. Trusteeship C. Res. 2019 (XXVI), 26 U.N. TRUSTEESHIP, Supp. 2, at 55,
U.N. Doc. T/1550 (1960).
168 GA Res. 1654, 16 U.N. GAOR 28-29, Agenda Item No. 88-22 U.N. Doc. A/C.
366 (1961).
169 Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Re-
port of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Po and Rio Muni), U.N.
Doc. A/AC.109/L.348 (Nov. 3, 1966) (mimeo).
170Id. § 82.
171Id. §§ 133, 179.
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majority of the people accepted continued Spanish rule." Having
been granted liberty to interview all accessible persons in the terri-
tory, the Mission subsequently met with representatives of ethnic
and economic groups to determine the truth and extent of the al-
leged political suppression."
The Mission unanimously concluded that under the existing ar-
rangement most power was still vested in the Spanish Commis-
sioner-General and that the electoral base was too narrow. 4  The
Mission found evidence of both racial discrimination and political
suppression 7' and determined that "there is unanimity among all
sections of the population in favour of the attainment of indepen-
dence without delay."' 8  The General Assembly accepted the Re-
port in full and requested Spain to hold "a general election for the
whole territory on the basis of a unified electoral roll," to "transfer
effective power to the government resulting from this election,"
and "to set a date for independence as recommended by the Special
Committee."'1 7
C. Regional Fact-Finding Bodies
Impartial fact-finding is also a feature of several regional sys-
tems of peace-keeping. Thus the Convention for the Establishment
of the Central American Court of Justice, signed in 1907 by Costa
Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Salvador, bound the
signatories "to submit all controversies or questions" to a five-mem-
ber tribunal composed of representatives from each nation."1 Even
at that early date, the drafters wisely provided that the Court could
"temporarily transfer its residence [from Costa Rica] ... in order
to insure the exercise of its functions."'179
Under the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro,' the OAS Council may, pend-
ing the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, appoint a commission
to investigate and report following armed or unarmed aggressive
172 1d. SS 6, 179-81, 195.
173id. 55 271-85.
174Id. §§ 288-89.
175Id. § 290.
176 Id. 292.
177 G.A. Res. 2230, 21 U.N. GAOR 2 (1967) (mimeo).
178 Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, art.
I, as quoted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L 231 (Supp. 1908).
179 Id. art. V, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. at 233.
180 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and Final Act of the Inter-
American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Sept. 2,
1947,62 Stat. 1681 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 (1948).
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acts which "might endanger the peace of America."'81  A charac-
teristic OAS fact-finding took place in 1950, when Haiti and the
Dominican Republic exchanged accusations of subversion. Six days
after these allegations, a five-member commission composed of OAS
Council representatives selected by the Council chairman began its
investigation. Empowered to hear witnesses and to take deposi-
tions, the commission held hearings in Washington and travelled
to interview members of the governments of Haiti and the Domini-
can Republic as well as suspected plotters, exiles, and prisoners.
After working for two months, the commission reported that the
Dominican Government had indeed aided in a conspiracy against
Haiti, and it absolved Haiti of any complicity in a counter-conspir-
acy' Consequently, the Organ of Consultation established a Spe-
cial Committee for the Caribbean to supervise a settlement. 8 '
In 1963 the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African
Unity, obligated to "co-ordinate inter-African co-operation, ' ap-
pointed a seven-member commission to ascertain the facts in the
Moroccan-Algerian border dispute and to recommend a solution.
This commission, consisting of technical and legal experts from
Ethiopia, Mali, Senegal, Ivory Coast, the Sudan, Tanzania, and Ni-
geria, has in ten meetings studied the conflicting historical claims
and visited the disputed area but has failed to find a mutually ac-
ceptable solution to the territorial dispute. Nevertheless, the peace
of the territory has remained largely unbroken since the commis-
sion's establishment, confirming the subsidiary use of fact-finding
to bring the disputants into a "cooling chamber."' 85
Fact-finding by British Commonwealth teams has also aided in
easing political tensions and dosing the credibility gap. In 1964
the Colonial Secretary requested eleven lawyers, politicians, and
election commission members representing six Commonwealth Na-
tions "to observe the British Guiana election" and report upon the
fairness of the "administrative arrangements," the extent of "free-
dom of expression of different points of view," and "any other mat-
ters.., affecting the fair and free conduct of the elections" which
were being held just prior to independence in an atmosphere of in-
181 Id. art. 6, 62 Stat. at 1683, 21 U.W.T.S. at 99.
182 Report of the Commission, OAS Doc. C-1-67-E (1950).
2 8 3 Declaration of OAS Council Acting Provisionally as Organ of Consultation, Res.
ll, O.A.S. Doc. C-5A-54-E (1950).
18 4 CHARTEsR OF THE ORGANIZATION Op AFncAN UNITY art. XlI (2), 479 U.N.-
T.S. 39, 78 (1963).
185 See 1966 AFscA REsEARca BULL. (PoLTcAL SEmsS) 631-33; 1967 AnucA
RnsHAtCa BLL (PoLrnicAL Smils) 696b.
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tense heat and mutual distrust between the principal political par-
ties. 8 ' After visiting 200 of the 772 polling places and 34 of the
35 polling districts, and attending public meetings and hearings,
the Commonwealth team concluded that the elections had been free
and fair.'87 Thus, despite the country's intense political conflicts,
the validity of this crucial election has not been seriously disputed
even by the losers.
The Western European community has also evolved several
systems of peaceful settlement that include fact-finding. The Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights, established by the 1950 Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms,' functions as a preliminary screening and investigatory
body for the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and
for the Court of Human Rights.8 9 The Convention provides that
the Commission "shall consist of a number of members equal to
that of the High Contracting Parties... elected by the Committee
of Ministers ... from a list of names drawn up by the Bureau of
the Consultative Assembly [of the Council of Europel.' 90  Inves-
tigations are conducted by seven-member subcommissions composed
of Commission members. Each party to the dispute is permitted to
nominate one Commissioner to serve on the subcommission, and
the remaining places are filled by drawing lots from a list of Com-
mission members.'9 ' A subcommission may "instruct one of its
members to undertake an enquiry" or may, as a unit, "work in a
place other than the seat of the Council of Europe.'
192
The more traditional European Convention for the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes,193 signed in 1957, provides that a five-
member Conciliation Commission composed of two disputant na-
18 BRTrrIsH GUIANA, REPORT BY TnE COmmONWEALTH TEAM OF OBSERVES ON
THE ELECTION IN DECEMBER 1964, para. 1, COLONIAL No. 359, para. 1 (1965).
187 Id. paras. 4-5, 19.
188 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Human Rights
Convention).
189 Human Rights Convention, arts. 28, 32, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 229 (1953). As of
1964, the Convention had been ratified by Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 1964 EUROPEAN YAItRBOOK 430.
190 Human Rights Convention, arts. 20, 21 (1), 213 U.N.T.S. 234-36.
'91Id. art. 29, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240, and Rule 18 of the Commission, COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, Y.B. OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1955-57, 1964
(1958).
192 Commission Rules 21, 58, COUNCIL or EUROPE, op. cit. supra note 191, at 66,
82.
193 320 U.N.T.S. 243 (1958) [hereinafter cited as European Convention].
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tionals and three non-nationals chosen by the disputants shall pro-
ceed in accordance with the 1907 Hague Commission of Enquiry
rules.'94 In addition, the signatories are bound "to allow [the com-
mission] to proceed in their territory... and to visit the localities
in question."'95
D. Fact-Finding by Non-Governmental Organizations
In addition to the host of governmental institutions engaged
in fact-finding, many private groups utilize commissions to report
upon areas of international conflict Three hundred and sixty-
eight of these national and international organizations have been
granted consultative status by the United Nations Economic and
Social Council and are called upon by the Council to submit reports
concerning social, political, educational, and economic questions.'9
The Anti-Slavery Society, for example, in March 1967, reported to
the United Nations Human Rights Commission that it had found
slave markets operating in Saudi Arabia.' Similarly, the Interna-
tional League for the Rights of Man maintains a far-flung and
highly respected fact-reporting system that discloses violations of
fundamental human rights set out in the Human Rights Declaration
and the Covenants.9 8 Other important non-governmental fact-find-
ing organizations include the International Commission of Jurists,
which has prepared field studies of such matters as the erection of
the Berlin Wall... and the 1964 Panama Canal Zone riots,2"0 and
Amnesty International, which supports on-the-spot investigations of
detentions and trials which may involve imprisonment for "holding
or expressing any religious, political or other opinion that does not
advocate violence."' '
'94Id. arts. 6, 12(1), 320 U.N.T.S. 243 (1958). The 1907 Hague Rules are dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 48-64 supra. The European Convention has been
ratified by Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. COUNCL OF EURoPE, 1964 EuRoPEAN YEARBOOK
431 (1966).
19 5 European Convention, art. 14,320 U.N.T.S. 243,249 (1958).
196 U.N CHARTER arts. 57, 63. Report of the Economic and Social Council, 21
U.N. GAOR, Supp. 3, at 110-13, U.N. Doc. A/6303 (1966).
197 N.Y. Times, March 20, 1967, p. 11, coL 3 (city ed.).
198 Baldwin, Some Techniques for Human Rights, 9 INT'L ASS'NS 466, 469 (1957);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A), 3 U.N. GAOR 71-77, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
G-A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Jan. 12, 1967 (mimeo).
19 INTmATIONAL COMMnISSION OF JURISTS, THE BERL N WALL (1962).
2 0 0 INTERNATIONAL CoMNIssION OF JURISTS, REPORT ON THE E VENTS iN PAN-
AMA, JANUARY 9-12, 1964 (1964).
201 1 AmNrsY ACTION 1 (1966).
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E. National Commission Systems
On the level of national decision-making, machinery has also
been devised for credible fact-finding, the outstanding example be-
ing the British royal commission and departmental committee sys-
tem. British royal commissions are ad hoc bodies appointed by the
Crown upon the advice of the cabinet to inquire into and report
upon some aspect of political, social, or economic policy requiring
reform. Departmental committees, which are less prestigious
bodies, are appointed by a cabinet minister to investigate matters
of lesser importance.
The earliest known royal commission report was the Domesday
Book of 1086 which was compiled by barons, justices, and legates
despatched by William the Conqueror with the awesome mission
of determining the taxable value of every English estate.02 Al-
though similar fact-finding commissions were employed throughout
the Tudor era, they increasingly became instruments of oppressive
royal justice and quasi-courts. With the rise of parliamentary su-
premacy they were replaced, and fact-finding by select committees
of Parliament became the fashion.03 Only in Victorian times did
royal commissions begin their role, now rehabilitated, as instru-
ments for determining government policy in an era of increasing
ministerial responsibility. Much of the factual ammunition that
helped secure the great nineteenth century reforms came from these
commissions.
°2 0 4
Only the briefest generalizations may here be made about the
procedures of the various royal commissions, of which there have
been some twenty-two since 1949.0 A commission's terms of
reference are to be found in its royal warrant, which specifies the
matters to be investigated as well as the commission's powers.0 6
Although investigations are normally conducted without the power
to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of docu-
ments, the 1921 Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act does envisage
that Parliament resolve to establish a commission composed of ex-
ecutive appointees and confer such powers upon the commission
20 2 CLOKIE & ROBINSON, ROYAL CoMIssIoNS OF INQUIRY 28 (1937).
203 Id. at 49-50.
204 Id. at 54-79.
2 05 BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES, ROYAL COMISSIONS AND SIMILAR BODIES
IN GREAT BRITAIN (R-5605) (1963). Current figures courtesy of British Information
Services.
206 Gosnell, British Royal Commissions of Inquiry, 49 POL. Sci. Q. 84, 85-87
(1934).
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when a matter is of "urgent public importance. 20 7  The royal com-
missions themselves are named by cabinet order-in-council. Once
established, a commission begins by interpreting its terms of refer-
ence and planning its method of operation.208 A staff is provided
to compile documentary material, and appropriate individuals and
groups are invited to submit written statements before testifying.209
Evidence may be kept confidential, and hearings may be public or
private.2
10
Organizationally, commissions have fallen into three approxi-
mate categories: expert, representative, and impartial. Representa-
tive commissions, composed of members of the various interest
groups most concerned with the subject of the investigation, are now
rarely employed, in part because they seldom produce unanimous
reports but instead tend to encourage polemic restatements of prior
positions rather than new insights 1  The twelve-member Sankey
Coal Commission of 1919, established to explore working condi-
tions in the mining industry and composed of representatives of
labor and management, thus produced fully four final reports.21
As these findings often conflicted with each other, the credibility
of facts found was much diminished.
Other commissions, such as the Sewage Disposal Commission
of 1898-1915 and the Museums Commission, have been composed
entirely of experts?13 The Royal Commission on Population in-
cluded a statistician, a medical doctor, and an economist.2 4 The
Commission on Unemployment Insurance of 1930-1932 was com-
posed of a judge, a municipal councillor, a social worker, and a po-
litical economist.215 In general, expert commissions are used to
investigate the narrower technical problems of public administra-
tion.
Impartial commissions are now favored for most issues, al-
207 11 Geo. 5, c. 7; Gosnell, supra note 206, at 101.
20sDEPARTmENTAL CONMMIE ON THE PROCED E E OF ROYAL COMMISSIONS,
REPORT, CD. No. 5235, at 9 (1910).
209 Gosnell, supra note 206, at 100.
210 Ibid.
211 WEBB, METHODS OF SOCIAL STUDY 142-57 (1932).
212 SANKEY COAL COMM'N, REPORT, CastD. No. 359 (1919).
213 ROYAL COMM'N ON SEWAGE DISPOSAL, REPORT, CD. No. 7821 (1916); ROYAL
COMM'N ON NAT'L MusEuMs AND GALLERIES, F]NAL REPORT, CMD. No. 3401, at
1-4 (1929).
214 ROYAL COMM'N ON POPULATION, REPORT, CMD. No. 7695, at 1-4 (1949).
215 ROYAL COMN'N ON UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, RNAL REPORT, CMI. NO.
4185, at iii (1932).
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though a mixture of impartial and representative membership, with
a preponderance of the former, continues to be employed. The
Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rho-
desia and Nyasaland, for example, included a number of British
Privy Councillors, a former colonial governor, a lady novelist from
Kenya, a Canadian constitutional lawyer, a Rhodesian judge, as well
as an African chieftain, an African trade unionist, and an African
politician.2 16
Although many commissions are composed of three to five
members, some broad inquiries may require greater manpower, al-
though the increased membership has not always been beneficial.
The twenty-seven-member Royal Commission on Labour was criti-
cized for its inability to develop a coherent research program,"'
but the twenty-six-member Advisory Commission on the Review of
the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland produced an exhaus-
tive, coherent report with only marginal dissent. In most cases,
however, smaller commissions have proven cheaper, faster, less ob-
trusive, and more likely to produce a well-researched, unanimous
report 2 1
8
The commission system of fact-finding has been addressed to
international issues with considerable success. The Palestine Com-
mission of 1937 travelled to the strife-torn area and conducted
thirty public and forty private sessions in Jerusalem, utilizing power
specially conferred on it by the Palestine government to compel
production of evidence.219 The Commonwealth team observing the
1964 British Guiana elections included representatives from India,
Canada, Nigeria, Malta and Trinidad, and Tobago and, as noted
above, engaged in active field-observation." The East Africa
Royal Commission, during its two trips to Kenya, Uganda, and Tan-
ganyika, also stressed the value of "informal talks with large num-
bers of people" in throwing "some light on the human problems
with which we are concerned."
221
In the field of overseas and international policy-making, royal
216 AUvlSoRy Comm'N ON THE REVIEw oF THE CONSTITUTION OF RHODESIA AND
NYASALAND, REPORT, CMND. No. 1148, at 6-7 (1960).
217 WEBB, op. cit. supra note 211, at 144.
218 See, e.g., NEWFOUNDLAND, ROYAL COMM'N OF GOV'T ON THE ECONOMIC
SITUATION, REPORT, CMD. No. 4788 (1935).
219 PALESTINE ROYAL COMM'N, REPORT, CMD No. 5479, at x (1937).
2 20 BRITISH GUIANA, REPORT BY THE COMMONWEALTH TEAM OF OBSERVERS ON
THE ELECTION IN DECEMBER 1964, COLONIAL No. 359, paras. 1, 4-5, 19 (1965).
221EAST AFRICA ROYAL COMM'N, 1953-55, REPORT, CMD. No. 9475, at xiii
(1955).
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commissions have investigated colonial and Commonwealth admin-
istration, the conduct of the Boer war in South Africa,222 the failure
of the Dardanelles military campaign, 2' and the economic problems
of Newfoundland, 4 as well as the causes of civil strife in Pales-
tine225 and Malta.226  Important and highly controversial policy in-
novation has been facilitated by credible fact determinations which
make traditional preconceptions untenable in a way policy rhetoric
could not. The East Africa Royal Commission's voluminous report
thus became the basis of a radical new policy of integrated land
tenure in Kenya's former White Highlands. The facts, as found
by the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, became the basis for the painful but in-
evitable decision to disband the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Federation.
While serving primarily to test the fact assumptions underlying a
government policy, commissions have also served to apportion
blame for a particular failure and to bring about important changes
of political and administrative policy and public opinion.
The royal commission system is not, of course, without its pit-
falls. Ministers can influence the outcome of an inquiry by their
selection of commissioners and by their drafting and interpretation
of the commissions' terms of references 2 Some commissions have
"ground exceeding slow." Indeed, this would at times appear to be
a vice deliberately exploited by governments seeking to delay re-
form.228  Nevertheless, in the foreign policy area, British govern-
ments during the past century and a half have found that an im-
partial, respected commission, while scarcely a substitute for the
day-to-day decision-making responsibility of the government, can
be highly useful in respect to a limited number of very controversial
or very fundamental issues in raising the level of the informational
component in official decision-making and private debate. It can
also be helpful in dosing the credibility gap between the public
and private sectors of decision-making.
United States presidents may establish commissions under a va-
2 2 2 ROYAL COMMWN ON THE WAR IN SOUTH AFwcA, CD. No. 1789 (1904).
223 ROYAL COMM'N To INvESTIGATE THE DARDENELLES OPERATIONS, CMD. No.
371 (1919).
2 2 4 NEWFOUNDLAND, ROYAL CoMM'N OF GOV'T ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION,
REPORT, C~m. No. 4788 (1935).
2 2 5 PALESTINE ROYAL COMM'N, REPORT, CMD. No. 5479 (1937).
226 ROYAL COMM'N ON MALTA, REPORT, CMD. No. 3993 (1932).
2 27 WIHARE, GovmERm rNT BY COMM ITTE 72-75 (1955).
2281d. at 90.
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riety of constitutional directives: to "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed," to "require the opinion, in writing of the principal
officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relat-
ing to the duties of their respective offices" as Commander in Chief;
under the foreign relations power; under the "emergency power";
and as an officer authorized to recommend legislation to Con-
gress.229 Yet United States executive commissions have been of
relatively minor significance, particularly when compared to the
numerous and powerful investigating committees that have been
established by the legislative branch of the federal government.
However, the few executive commissions which have been ap-
pointed have filled a useful role.
One of the most efficient and convincing commissions to be
appointed was President Roosevelt's Special Inquiry Committee To
Study the Rubber Situation."' It was established to find means of
obtaining alternative supplies of rubber following Japanese suc-
cesses in Southeast Asia early in World War II. Credibility here
played a particularly important and complex role. President Roose-
velt needed the support of a highly credible committee to overcome
opposition to the gasoline rationing necessary for rubber conserva-
tion.28' Consequently, on August 6, 1942, he appointed Bernard
Baruch chairman and added Dr. Karl T. Compton, president of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Dr. James B. Conant,
President of Harvard University. The President directed them to
make "a quick but adequate survey of the entire rubber question."2"2
The committee immediately assembled a technical staff of twenty-
five and sent it through the country to gather information on stock-
piles, requirements, and synthetic rubber manufacturing processes.
Representatives of government and industry were heard, and the
committee was furnished with, much documentation.233 On Sep-
tember 10, 1942, the committee duly recommended a massive con-
servation plan to avoid "both a military and civilian collapse.,
234
The prestigious report was submitted to Congress, and gasoline ra-
tioning was instituted soon thereafter. 5
229 U.S. CONST. art. UI, §§ 2-3.
230 Report of the Special Comm. To Study the Rubber Situation and To Recommend
Action, H.R. Doc No. 836, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) (hereinafter cited as Rubber
Report].
2 31 MARCY, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS 68 (1945).
232 Id. at 1.
233 Rubber Report 18-19.
234 Id. at 1.
2 3 5 MARCY, op. cit. supra note 231, at 69.
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Perhaps the most notable American experiment with the com-
mission system of fact-determination originated in joint executive-
legislative initiative. As a result of demands made in and out of
Congress, both the Senate and House Committees on Government
Operations in 1953 recommended the establishment of a Commis-
sion on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
(the Second Hoover Commission).28 The act establishing the
Commission charged it with the duty "to promote economy, effi-
ciency, and improved service in the transaction of the public busi-
ness" in all executive agencies." 7 The President, President of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House were each directed to select
two men from public and two from private life to serve on the
twelve-member panel.2 8 In addition to Mr. Hoover, the appoin-
tees included Herbert Brownell, Jr., James A. Parley, Joseph P.
Kennedy, and Senator John L. McClellan. The Commission was
vested with powers of subpoena and summons, although it proved
prestigious enough to have no difficulty in obtaining information
without resorting to coercion.23
The Commission appointed specialized task forces with respon-
sibility for examining sub-topics such as budget and accounting,
medical services, procurement, and personnel and civil service.
Nearly two hundred persons manned these task forces, including
Supreme Court Justices, three governors or former governors, col-
lege presidents, admirals, and members of professional groups such
as the American Bar Association and the American Medical Asso-
ciation.2 40 The task forces themselves often subdivided and hired
experts of their own, including economists and accountants.
The thoroughness of this process is typified by the Subcommit-
tee on Depot Utilization, which submitted its report only after vis-
iting "more than 30 major storage activities throughout the United
States" and consulting with nine representatives of the warehousing
industry.241
The reports of the task forces were next reviewed by teams of
230 Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, Report on S. 106, S. Doc. No. 216, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); House Comm. on Gov't Operations, Report on H.R. 992,
H.R. Doc. No. 505, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
237 67 Stat. 142 (1953).
28 67 Stat. 143 (1953).
2 3 9 MAcNEiL & METZ, THE HOOVER REPORT 1953-55, at 16, 19 (1956).
240 Ibid.
241 U.S. COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXEC. BRANCH OF THE GOVT, SuB-
COMMITrEE REPORT OF DEPOT UTILIZATION 4, 90-91 (1955).
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commission members selected by Mr. Hoover on the basis of their
expertise. These, in most instances, revised or rejected the task
force recommendations as the result of differences of judgment or
on the basis of further information gathered by the task force. 42
The Commission as a whole then reviewed these drafts, settled upon
final formulations, and included any dissents by other commission-
ers in a final report made up of 519 recommendations, 274 of which
were implemented.24
Another type of presidential fact-finding commission is illus-
trated by the President's Commission on the Assassination of Presi-
dent Kennedy, which took the form of a board of inquiry. The
Warren Commission was appointed on November 30, 1963, pur-
suant to an Executive Order directing it to "evaluate and report
upon the facts relating to the assassination ... and the subsequent
violent death of the man charged with the assassination."24  The
Commission, financed by the President's Emergency Fund, was
granted subpoena and summons powers by Congress245 and the
power "to prescribe its own procedures."246  The seven-member
body engaged a general counsel and fourteen assistants, in addition
to a staff of historians, investigators, and attorneys. 7 It was au-
thorized to take depositions upon oath or affirmation from witnesses
designated by the Commission."' Hearings were conducted in pri-
vate unless a witness requested otherwise. Hearsay and secondary
documents were admitted as evidence." At both the deposition
proceedings and the hearings, a witness was entitled to his own
counsel to advise him on his rights, to make "brief objections to
questions," and to clarify testimony by questioning the witness. 5
Although the Commission and its staff privately interviewed
552 witnesses, the bulk of its factual information was supplied by
various agencies. The FBI conducted 25,000 interviews and sub-
24 2 MACNEIL & METZ, op. cit. supra note 239, at 20-22.
248 U.S. Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, Action by the Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch of the Govt on the Second Hoover Comm'n, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, S.
Doc. No. 1289 (1958). Forty-four additional recommendations were awaiting imple-
mentation as of 1957. Ibid.
24 4 Exec. Order No. 11130, 28 Fed. Reg. 12789 (1963).
245 77 Stat. 362 (1963).
2 4 6 Exec. Order No. 11130, 28 Fed. Reg. 12789 (1963).
247 U.S. REPORT OF THE PIRSIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE AsSAssINATION OF PRESI-
DENT JOHN F. KENNEDY 475-82 (1964).
2481d. at 501.
249 Id. at xiii-xiv.
250 Id. at 501, 503.
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mitted over 2,300 reports. The Treasury Department's Secret Ser-
vice, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency
furnished answers to questions formulated by Commission counsel
after study of preliminary agency reports.251 In addition, Walter
E. Craig, American Bar Association president, represented the de-
ceased assassination suspect. He was afforded access to "all work-
ing papers, reports, and other data in Commission files" and was
permitted to cross-examine witnesses.252
The final report was submitted on September 24, 1964, fol-
lowed by volumes of exhibits and transcripts of testimony. It con-
cluded that Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby had each acted
alone." Initially, at least, the Report has fulfilled its function. It
examined an issue of great political, social, and historical impor-
tance. A group of men of credibility, competence, and impartiality
beyond reasonable challenge supervised and participated in an en-
compassing, fair, and relatively speedy operation of fact-finding.
This operation yielded a theory which, if not beyond question, has
thus far withstood effective challenge. At a time when doubt and
suspicion might have rent the nation, it produced a credible finding
of fact which the populace, by and large, has found itself able to
accept. Although the assassination of a President in somewhat
murky circumstances would seem charged with political passion, it
has not been possible, despite much effort and some evidenciary
support, to fan a great public debate, let alone a deep rift between
public and private sectors of the community. This is an important
distinction between the assassination crisis and the Viet-Nam crisis.
Might the distinction not in part be attributed to the difference in
methods of fact-finding used in the two situations?
III. THE IMPACT OF IMPARTIAL FACT-FINDING
ON THE CREDIBILITY GAP 1968-1992:
A RESEARCH PROPOSAL
This article began with the hypothesis that impartial fact-find-
ing processes, functionally structured, can be useful in narrowing
the scope of conflict in certain disputes. The brief survey of the
experimental uses to which impartial fact-finding has been put in
international, regional, and national communities does no more
251 Id. at xii-xiii.
2521 d. at xiv-xv.
253 Id. at 21.
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than give the hypothesis itself sufficient credibility to warrant fur-
ther research.
Such research should attempt to measure changes in attitude by
parties to a dispute brought about by various fact-finding processes
and to collate this impact and the kind of process employed, in an
effort to establish some norms of credible fact determination. Such
norms, it may be conjectured, would be equally applicable to dis-
putes between states and disputes between public and private sectors
of the national decision-making process. They would serve not
only to close the credibility gap between these disputants but also
as a guide for more reliable and informed major decisions.
To determine impact of various fact-finding processes, it will be
necessary to measure both changes of attitirde and changes of be-
havior. Attitudinal changes would best be tested by a "before-and-
after" survey, provided the researcher can become aware of the re-
search potential of a dispute early enough to measure attitudes be-
fore a fact-finding process is instituted and providing he is correct
in predicting recourse to the process so that changes in attitude can
be determined by a subsequent re-survey of the same group. A
somewhat more accessible but less reliable source of attitudinal
data is to be found by comparing positions taken by leading popular
journals before and after an important fact-finding process has been
invoked. For example, when the Church in Malta issued a Pastoral
letter prohibiting its flock from voting for the Constitutionalist
Party, The Times of London declared this to be a gratuitous feud
for which the Church was responsible.254 However, in 1932, when
a royal commission blamed the dispute on the injudicious behavior
of the leader of the Constitutionalists, The Times in a volte face,
lauded the Report for clearing away "clouds of propaganda" and
abandoned its advocacy of constitutional disestablishment of the
church.255
Another example of a change in the attitude of a leading jour-
nal occurred after the publication of the Palestine Commission Re-
port of 1937."6 The Economist, writing prior to the report's issu-
ance, argued for the establishment of "mixed areas" in which Arab
and Jewish communes would coexist side by side, along with a "re-
served area" for Palestinian Arabs.257 After the Commission re-
254 London Times, April 20, 1931, p. 15, cols. b-c.
255 London Times, Feb. 12, 1932, p. 13, col. c; ROYAL COMM'N ON MALTA, RE-
PORT, CMD. No. 3993 (1932).
2 5 6 PALESTINE ROYAL COMM'N, REPORT, CMD. No. 5479 (1937).
257 Palestine, 123 ECON. 716, 717 (1936).
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ported that Arab and Jew could not be expected to live harmoni-
ously in close proximity, The Economist abandoned its communal
proposal and adopted the report's partition plan."as
Study of changes in behavior require the application of both
historical and psychological methodology. What behavioral im-
pact, for example, did the Malaysia Commission's report have on
the nations of the international community and the delegates
through whom the nations act at international conferences and as-
semblies? It is historically noteworthy, for example, that the re-
port "clearing" Malaysia was received and accepted by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. He publicly expressed his assent
to the General Assembly on September 14, 1963,269 and Malaysia
was given the popular accolade of election by the General Assem-
bly to the United Nations Security Council (for a split term) on
November 1, 1963.260 Were these two events related? Were na-
tions and delegates swayed by the credibility of the Mission's report?
Would the results have been otherwise had there been no impartial
fact determination? Only intensive, in-depth interviews can estab-
lish the causal connection, if any, of the delegates' behavior toward
Malaysia's candidature and the Mission report. On the other hand,
similar research should be applied to an instance of international
2 58 Partition of Palestine, 128 ECON. 57-58 (1937). Of course, not all fact-finding
commissions are equally successful in altering opinions. During the Fourth Commit-
tee debate concerning the credibility of Ambassador de Ribbing's report on Oman, the
United Arab Republic, pressing for a new mission, argued that "the terms of reference
of the mission invited to visit the territory had been derived from the invitation issued
by the United Kingdom and the Sultan of Muscat" Saudi Arabia asserted that de Rib-
bing "had been the guest of the Sultan of Muscat and could only visit the regions which
the authorities of the Sultan had wished it to visit and could only meet the people whom
they had wished it to meet." Iraq criticized the report and wondered whether the atti-
tude of the people interviewed would have been different had both parties to the dis-
pute been represented. 18 U.N. GAOR, 4th Comm. 451.
Similarly, reactions to the 1954 Trusteeship Council Mission to Tanganyika, 15 U.N.
TRUSTEESI-P, Supp. 3, at 1, U.N. Doc. T/1169 (1955), which recommended accelera-
tion of the schedule for Tanganyikan independence, were in some instances extremely
negative. The Economist wrote that "It is fair that visiting United Nations missions
should provide a sounding board of African views; but to swallow them almost whole
merely exposes their naivete." Planning East Africa, 174 ECON. 356 (1955). The Ob-
server commented that
ETihe report itself is not altogether realistic. Its authors recommend a time-
limit of less than twenty years for the achievement of self-government with-
out apparently having considered such questions as the supply of trained ad-
ministrators or the essential connection between economic and political de-
velopment. Nevertheless, they have obviously endeavoured to be fair and
objective and they have produced what is, on the whole, a highly encouraging
picture. The Observer, Jan. 30, 1955, p. 6, col. 3.
259 Final Conclusions of the Secretary-General Regarding Malaysia, 19 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. 1, at 27-28, U.N. Doc. A/5801 (1963).
260 18 U.N. GAOR, Agenda Item No. 16, at 2 (1963).
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
behavior less favorable to Malaysia's cause. Thus it would be use-
ful to have motivational analysis of participation in the 1964 Cairo
Conference by Heads of Non-Aligned Governments which did not
invite Malaysian participation, although it refrained from endors-
ing Indonesian condemnation of the new state and did allow Mala-
sia to be represented by two observers.26'
Another way to approach attitudinal and behavioral research in
the role of impartial fact-finding processes is to examine comparable
situations in one of which the process was used and the other in
which it was not. The suggested analogy between the Kennedy
assassination and the Viet-Nam war is admittedly rhetorical and not
scientific. A more evidently proximate set of comparisons could
be made between the reaction of the United Nations to the form of
independence granted Western Samoa by New Zealand and that
granted the Windward and Leeward Islands by Great Britain. In
both instances, tiny territories were given the power to assume full
sovereignty over all their affairs, and in both instances schemes -
albeit technically somewhat different - were devised by which the
former colonial power, at the pleasure of the former colony, would
continue to discharge certain functions in connection with defense
and foreign relations.26 In the case of West Samoa, however, the
United Nations, with the exception of the Soviet Union, made no
objection to the scheme and gave it overwhelming approval.26 In
the case of Britain's Windwards and Leewards, the United Nations
produced a strong, negative reaction and refused to regard the is-
lands as decolonized. 2" Research should indicate whether the dif-
ference in behavior of United Nations member states and delegates
in these two instances can be attributed to the Western Samoan ar-
rangement's having been arrived at after a plebescite supervised by
the General Assembly 65 in which the fact of popular consent to
the voluntary dependent status was dearly and impartially at-
261 See London Times, Oct. 12, 1964, p. 9, cols. a-b.
262 Treaty of Friendship between New Zealand and Western Samoa, 453 U.N.T.S.
3 (1962). REPORT OF THE ANTIGUA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE 1966, CMND.
No. 2963, at 19 (1966); REPORT OF THE WINDwARD ISLANDS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFERENCE, 1966, CMND. No. 3021, at 18 (1966).
263 27 U.N. SCOR, 1165th meeting 161 (1961).
264 Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, U.N.
Doc. A/AC/109/L. 378 Rev. 1 (March 10, 1967). This resolution reaffirmed "That
General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions continue to ap-
ply to these Territories ....
265 G.A. Res. 1569, 15 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 44, at 27, U.N.
Doc. A/4663 (1960).
1522 [Vol. 18: 1483
THE PROBLEM OF FACT-FINDING
tested,26 whereas Britain's arrangement with the Windwards and
Leewards was made in private negotiation between the governments
concerned.
Further research into the impact of fact-finding processes should
also endeavor to test the correlation, if any, between the credibility
of a fact found and the methodology of fact-finding employed. Ob-
viously, all fact-finding is not equally credible. For example, one
might conjecture that the findings of a Warren Commission are
more likely to effect changes in attitude and behavior than are the
Hanoi reports of Mr. Harrison Salisbury for the New York Times.
It is no comment on Mr. Salisbury, but it may be an inevitable lim-
itation on the role of the journalist as fact-finder that his reports
will be suspected of bias towards the editorial policy of the news-
paper for which he works. Even the respected Mr. Salisbury was
described as a "Hanoi-picked correspondent," and the New York
Times was criticized for publishing "propaganda statistics concern-
ing alleged civilian casualties on its front page without attribution
of any kind." '67 And it was widely noted that Salisbury's account
coincided with the editorial opposition of the New York Times to
the continued bombing of North Viet-Nam.26s
This survey of international, regional, national, and non-gov-
ernmental fact-finding processes suggests a number of hypothetical
correlations between the structure of the process employed and the
credibility of the facts found. They are set out, here, certainly not
as conclusions to be accepted, but as hypotheses to be tested:
1. Facts found are credible in direct proportion to the faith in
the appointing authority and/or the impartiality of the fact-
finders felt by all the parties to the dispute at the commence-
ment (not the conclusion) of the process.
2. Facts found are credible in direct proportion to the profes-
sional esteem and popular prestige of the fact-finders. Also,
where specialized facts are at issue, the credibility of the find-
ings increase in direct proportion to the acknowledged exper-
tise of the fact-finders.
3. The procedure used by fact-finders bears directly on the cred-
ibility of the facts found. Specifically, credibility is increased
where the fact-finders follow the essence, although not neces-
266 Report of the U.N. Commission for the Supervision of the Plebescite in West-
ern Samoa, 16 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 218, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/4840
(1961).
267 Address by Arthur Sylvester, Chicago Headline Club, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1967,
p. 24, col. 1.
2 68 Cf. "[I]f the full power of the United States is brought to bear there is little
doubt that the people and production of North Vietnam can be totally destroyed, with
nothing left to 'negotiate'...." Editorial, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1966, § IV, p. 6.
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sarily in technicalities, of a fair trial, 'viz., hear both sides, take
evidence in open sessions, and permit rebuttals, cross-examina-
tion, and summary by those giving evidence.
4. Facts found are credible in inverse proportion to the extent
of interference - both obstructive or "helpful" - by the par-
ties to the dispute.
5. The credibility of a fact-finding is diminished when it pro-
ceeds on the basis of partial evidence. Where an important
witness or group of witnesses refuses to cooperate the credi-
bility of the facts found will suffer unless the objection can be
overcome by the investigating body.
6. The credibility of a fact-finding suffers if the fact-finders re-
fuse, or consider themselves incompetent, to answer more dif-
ficult but essential subsidiary issues of fact.
7. Facts found are credible in direct proportion to the degree of
unanimity of the fact-finders. Also, if a fact-finding report
is contradicted by another fact-finding report, the credibility
of both is diminished.
8. Facts found are less credible insofar as they support the con-
tention of a party to a dispute which, prior to the finding, has
already irrevocably committed itself to that contention.
9. The credibility of a fact-finding varies in direct relation to the
erudition, logic, and thoroughness with which the process and
and findings are set out in the final report of the fact-finders.
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